

CAMARA DUE AT CEUTA

Spanish West Coast Dark Till Further Orders.

NEWS FROM MANZANILLO

Are Such as to Gently Break the News to Spain.

Gibraltar, July 22.—It is reported here that Admiral Camara's squadron of Spanish war ships which passed through the Suez canal and then turned back and started homeward, the admiral giving a pledge that his ships were bound for Spain, is expected at the Spanish naval settlement of Ceuta, opposite Gibraltar, shortly, where they will await events.

The maritime authorities of the province of Asturias have ordered all the guiding and harbor lights to be discontinued and the whole coast therefore will be dark at night until further orders.

Madrid, July 22.—All the lights at or near St. Sebastian, which is a fortified city situated on a small peninsula in the bay of Biscay, have been extinguished, in view of the possibility of an American attack.

A private dispatch from Havana says that an American force landed near Manzanillo, province of Santiago de Cuba, on Tuesday evening. The Spanish troops guarding the approaches of the bay, the dispatch adds, opened fire on the invaders, to which the Americans replied. An attack on the town by sea and land was expected by the time the message was sent. The crews of the Spanish gunboats which were sunk reached the land, according to the Havana message, saved most of their kits.

It is said in official circles that no dispatches having been received lately from Captain General Blanco the Spanish government is considering means of restoring communication with Cuba.

It is asserted here that the Spanish prisoners comprised in the capitulation of Santiago do not exceed 30,000 men and that the ammunition captured is almost useless.

SPANISH ADMIRALS TALK

Chicago, July 22.—W. E. Curtis sends the following from Annapolis to the Record: While the officers of Admiral Cervera's squadron decline to discuss the probabilities of peace or the consequences that may follow Watson's expedition and the invasion of Porto Rico, they talk very freely of their own experience and consider themselves as having been sacrificed to atone for the sins of the minister at Madrid. This expression was used by one of them in discussing the fate of their fleet. They declare that the dispatch of their vessels from Spain to the West Indies under the circumstances existing was an unprecedented example of administrative folly, for which Mr. Moret, then minister of the colonies at Madrid, was directly responsible, but he was supported by all of the members of the cabinet, except the minister of marine, who finally and with great reluctance consented to issue the necessary orders to Admiral Cervera. They explain that public sentiment in Madrid and elsewhere throughout the peninsula, as represented by the politicians and newspapermen, demanded some offensive demonstration toward the United States. They were not satisfied with the defensive policy of the administration. They were impatient because the Spanish army in Cuba was bottled up in Havana, Santiago and other ports by our blockade, and because every vessel sent out to its relief was captured as a prize of war. They insisted that a fleet of cruisers which was bottled up at Cadix should be sent out to destroy our commerce, take prizes among our shipping, and blockade and bombard the ports of the United States in retaliation for what our fleet was doing in Cuba.

Admiral Cervera's officers say that these demands were made by people who were not aware of the military situation, and the ministry could not make it known, without exposing the long-continued corruption of the marine department and the robbery of the government by the diversion of funds appropriated for naval defense. They think it possible the true state of affairs was not made known to the ministers and that perhaps Mr. Moret shared the delusion. The minister of marine, who was fully aware of the situation, remonstrated, and was sustained by prominent officers of the navy. But he was compelled to yield, and finally issued preliminary orders for an expedition which every man familiar with the navy knew was not only hopeless, but suicidal.

The vessels lacked arms, men and fuel, and one of them, the Cristobal Colon, did not carry guns enough for a ship of one-tenth its tonnage. When Admiral Cervera was asked where the guns were he replied: "In the pockets of the officers." It is claimed that on the four vessels—the Cristobal Colon, Vizcaya, Oquendo and Maria Teresa—there were only six guns of large caliber, two each upon the three last named.

When asked what the government expected to accomplish by sending out this fleet, one of the captains, with a sarcastic smile, replied that Moret, who is a dromedary, believed it was possible to bombard New York, Boston, Washington, Chicago, St. Louis and blockade at the port of the cities of the United States with four half-armed men-of-war and three torpedo boat destroyers.

"We all protested," he declared; "we knew that the moment we left Spain we were lost; that our destruction was merely a matter of time. We felt that we were sent as a sacrifice by the government to satisfy public clamor, but it was a matter of indifference whether we were properly armed or not. The less guns the better. The less guns the less loss. That is the dreadful story."

"We were left Cadix where we were promised coal and other supplies at St. Vincent, and we were denied them. We were sent out with no provisions and some guns, but the torpedo boats could not go any farther. Their machinery was unfit and we had to abandon them. They never could have crossed the Atlantic. They were not built for heavy weather."

"We sailed from Cape Verde on April 22—four cruisers and the torpedo boat destroyers Ferrer, Terror and Pluton in tow—making about eight knots an hour, and were accompanied by the hospital ship, the Alcantara. We did not have sufficient coal to reach Havana, but the minister of marine promised that we should meet two English frigates, the Rostorm and the Twickenham, laden with Cardiff coal, at Martinique. But they were not there. The French authorities refused to allow us to buy fuel, and the only way we could

get to Curacao, where the minister of marine told us we would find the coaling, was by taking the coal out of the bunkers of the hospital ship. This made it impossible for her to go any farther, and she still lies rotting in the harbor at Martinique, helpless, because the Frenchmen will not sell her coal and the Spanish government cannot send her any.

"We reached Curacao on May 14, expecting to find the coaling, but they were not there, and the Dutch authorities would allow us to buy only sufficient coal to take us to the nearest Spanish port, which was Santiago. Nor would they allow more than two of our vessels to enter the harbor. Thus we were trapped. Our government had betrayed us. We were at the mercy of the neutrality laws, and our only hope was to reach the harbor of Santiago, where we hoped to find shelter and fuel."

It should be said here in explanation that the two coaling stations, Rostorm and Twickenham, were captured by the St. Paul and St. Louis, respectively, and taken to Key West as prizes. They were in search of the Spanish fleet, having failed to make the rendezvous on the date arranged. This fact was unknown to Admiral Cervera and his officers until they reached Annapolis, and they were greatly relieved when they learned they had not been betrayed by their government.

"Who would suppose," continued one of the Spanish officers, "that the second capital of Cuba, and the most prosperous city on the island, would be empty of all provisions and supplies when we arrived there? So short were provisions that instead of receiving stores we were ordered by the government to take the sailors' rations from the holds of our ships and distribute them among the soldiers. The merchants had sold out and had not replaced their stock, so that they would have little to lose in case of the capture of the city by the Americans, while the commissariat of the army, by some fearful mismanagement, had made no provisions for the siege."

"Half the soldiers were sick and all of them were on starvation rations. During the battles of the first days of July 1898 sick men were carried in carriages and carts to the trenches and made to fight, although many of them fell from exhaustion. The hospitals were empty. We sent a lot of sailors from the ships to assist them, but none of our guns were taken off as requested in your papers. The only naval guns used in the fortifications were from the Reina Mercedes."

I asked the officers about the effect of the dynamite shells which the Vesuvius threw toward the city. They replied that the noise of the explosion caused great terror among the soldiers, and a great deal of earth was displaced, but the shells did not happen to fall where they could do great damage. All of Cervera's officers agree that the Vesuvius is a most formidable and destructive agent of war, but they express even greater admiration for the Oregon. They say the shells that were dropped over the city threw up a lot of dirt and disarranged the fortifications, but did no great damage, except to castle Morro, which was a conspicuous target. If the shells had been dropped into the city they would have caused great destruction; but it was beyond the range of the guns of the fleet. Several days before the fleet came out it was reported that the New Orleans discovered a torpedo boat destroyer creeping out one night and destroyed it. The Spanish officers say this is untrue. There were only two torpedo boat destroyers in the harbor, and neither of them attempted to go out until the fatal Sunday morning. It is suggested that a submarine boat which left Santiago one night with dispatches for San Juan may have been destroyed by the New Orleans.

I asked my friend who suggested the sort of the fleet. He threw up his hands in horror.

"Would that I knew," he exclaimed, "the man who suggested the fleet. It was the most cruel and unnecessary command that was ever given to brave men. We were ordered to enter the very gates of hell for no other purpose, as I can conceive, than to gratify the politicians and sensational managers of Spain, who clamored for some demonstration. Some of my comrades think there was an intention to bring about a disaster that would furnish an excuse to make peace, but I believe in the first theory."

"Did the sailors remonstrate? Was it true that you had to make them drunk to prevent a mutiny?"

"No, indeed," exclaimed my friend, indignantly. "They are the bravest men in the world. They know nothing about our plans. Not a man on board any of the ships except the commanders, was aware that he was expected to face almost certain death until the crisis started for the open sea that Sunday morning, and even then very few of them asked questions. The word was passed around that we were going out to fight the Yankees, and the poor fellows were enthusiastic about the prospect of a battle."

"Are no protests sent to Spain?"

"Yes, but very earnest protests. After we received our first orders, the admiral called a conference of the captains and we concluded that they were based upon a misapprehension. We could not conceive that our government would order our total destruction when nothing could be accomplished. Admiral Cervera sent a long cablegram to Madrid explaining the situation and demonstrating that it would be impossible for our fleet to escape destruction from an enemy that outnumbered us four to one. The only reply we got was a peremptory order to attack the Yankees immediately. Again Cervera sent a protest, but the entire responsibility of sacrifice upon the government at Madrid."

"Did you expect to escape?"

"No, we expected to die. As I have said, the sailors knew nothing of the fate that awaited them, but there was not an officer on the fleet who did not feel that his end had come. There was only one chance, a slight possibility that one or perhaps two of the vessels might escape. The arrangement of the Yankee fleet was favorable. The lookout told us that the Brooklyn had gone to the east and the New York was the only ship in sight that could surround the slowest of our vessels. It was the intention to run the Brooklyn immediately and sink or disable her, even though one of our vessels went down with her. Then it was hoped the others could outrun the battleships. Our plan failed because we could not get near enough to the Brooklyn. She did not close in on us like the Texas and Oregon, but stood off at long range, and when the Maria Teresa started for her she made a wide sweep and ran away. Cervera asked Commodore Schley why he did not come nearer, but got no satisfaction. But the Maria Teresa was almost instantly disabled by shells from the Texas, and the Oregon was a great surprise. We had no idea that any battleship could make her speed. It was something we were not prepared for. It was the Oregon that prevented our escape."

"What was the matter with the Spanish gunnery? Why did your shots do no more damage?"

"First, because we had only a few long-range guns. There were none on the Colon as only two each on the other ships. Then we had no proper range finders, and our sailors lacked practice. Our gunnery

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GARCIA MUCH GRIEVED

Text of His Trouble-Telling Letter to Shafter.

RAGGED BUT NOT BRUTAL

Quotes American History, and Quotes It Straight.

New York, July 22.—A dispatch from Santiago gives the following as being a letter sent by General Garcia to General Shafter:

"Sir—On May 12 the government of the republic of Cuba ordered me, as commander of the Cuban army in the east, to co-operate with the American army, following the plans and obeying the orders of its commander. I have done my best, sir, to fulfill the wishes of my government and I have been one of your most faithful subordinates, honoring myself in carrying out your orders as far as my powers have allowed me to do it."

"The city of Santiago surrendered to the American army, and news of that important event was given to me by persons entirely foreign to your staff. I have not been honored with a single word from yourself informing me about the negotiations for peace or the terms of the capitulation by the Spaniards. The important ceremony of the surrender of the city by yourself took place later on, and I only knew of both events by public reports."

"I was neither honored, sir, with a kind word from you inviting myself or any other officer of my staff to remain with the Cuban army on that memorable occasion."

"Finally, I know that you have left in power at Santiago the same Spanish authorities that for three years I have fought as the enemies of the independence of Cuba. I beg to say that these authorities have never been elected at Santiago by the residents of the city, but were appointed by royal decrees of the queen of Spain."

"I would agree, sir, that the army under your command should have taken possession of the city, the garrison and the forts. I would give my warm co-operation to any measure you may have proposed under American military law to hold the city for your army and to preserve public order until the time comes to fulfill the solemn pledge of the people of the United States to establish in Cuba

WHAT IT COST UNCLE SAM TO TAKE SANTIAGO

The United States has appropriated on account of the war \$232,000,000, and the actual expenditures thus far aggregate \$123,000,000. Most of this has been spent in the operations resulting in the surrender of Santiago. Other noteworthy expenditures are coal and ammunition used by Dewey, by the blockading squadron and in Sampson's meritorious bombardment of San Juan.

In detail the war has cost, as nearly as can be stated in round figures gathered from official sources in Washington, as follows:

KILLED AND WOUNDED IN BATTLE.

Total officers, privates and marines killed..... 247
Total officers, privates and marines wounded..... 1,323
Total reported missing..... 81

HOW THE MONEY HAS BEEN SPENT.

Transportation, mobilizing soldiers and for troops.	\$17,000,000
Subsistence Shafter's army twenty-three days.	500,000
Relief expedition for Cuba.	1,500,000
Additional to increase naval strength.	20,000,000
Expenditures for ordnance and arms.	5,000,000
Commissary supplies for mobilized army.	8,000,000
Tents, clothing and camp equipment.	10,000,000
Horses and mules.	3,000,000
Coal for warships.	4,000,000
Pay for officers and army.	17,000,000
Pay for officers and sailors.	3,000,000
Strengthening sea coast defenses.	8,000,000
Laying harbor mines, bombarding and arms.	1,500,000
Increased cable and telegraph tolls.	2,500,000
Increased force clerks, special agents, expenses and salaries.	2,000,000
Increased secret service and caring for Spanish prisoners.	500,000
Ammunition bombarding Santiago fortifications.	4,000,000
Miscellaneous expenses preparing for war.	6,500,000
Total appropriations for war.	\$232,000,000
Total actual expenditures.	\$123,000,000

a free and independent government. But when the question arises of appointing authorities in Santiago de Cuba, under the peculiar circumstances of our thirty years' strife against Spanish rule, I cannot see but with the deepest regret that such authorities are not elected by the Cuban people, but are the same ones selected by the queen of Spain and hence are ministers to defend against the Cubans the Spanish sovereignty.

"A rumor, too absurd to believe, general, ascribes the reason of your measures and of the orders for sending my army to go into Santiago for fear of massacres and revenge against the Spaniards. Allow me, sir, to protest against the shadow of such an idea. We are not savages, ignoring the rules of civilized warfare. We are a poor, ragged army, as ragged and as poor as was the army of your forefathers in their noble war for independence, but, as did the heroes of Saratoga and Yorktown, we respect too deeply our cause to disgrace it with barbarism and cowardice."

"In view of all these reasons, I sincerely regret to be unable to fulfill any longer the orders of my government, and therefore I have today tendered to the commander-in-chief of the Cuban army, Major General Maximiliano Gomez, my resignation as commander of this section of our army."

"Awaiting his resolution, I withdraw my forces to the interior. Very respectfully yours,
CAXITO GARCIA."

BACK TO THE FARMS.

Santiago de Cuba, July 22.—(Delayed in transmission.)—A large exodus of Cubans is expected during the next few days, as they are returning to the cultivation of the country, that work being the chief source of the wealth of the island.

The greater part of Garcia's army leaves tomorrow at daybreak tomorrow for the country, that work being the chief source of the wealth of the island.

Notwithstanding General Garcia's bitter complaint that he had been ignored and that the restoration of the Spanish civil authority in the city of Santiago was most offensive to him and that in consequence of this he had been forced to tender his resignation as a general in the Cuban army, he is going on with his preparations for a contest with the Spanish forces at Holguin and Manzanillo quite as though nothing had happened.

Tomorrow General Garcia will issue a decree authorizing all Cubans who have been driven from their plantations and country homes by the Spaniards and who have taken refuge for safety in the cities and towns, to return to the country and go to work on their farms and plantations, assuring them of protection by his forces. He has added the permission to those in his ranks who were recruited from the

farm lands and who were employed in the fields at the outbreak of the war.

Although it must be plain that General Garcia's attitude is inexplicable. His permission to the men in his ranks to go back to work on the farms is construed to mean an effort to disband his forces. But this may not be altogether justified. It is certain a great many of them will continue to fight.

Washington, July 22.—The war department was today still in official ignorance of the reported retirement of Garcia with his army from the American lines at Santiago and the resignation of that Cuban general. It was considered a little singular that General Shafter had not made a report to the department of the case by telegraph, but he had so far shown disposition to acquiesce in the department with the state of affairs at Santiago unless called upon by direct inquiry by the secretary of war. Thus it was not known at the department officially that General Wood had been created military commander of Santiago, although the fact would seem to be one of sufficient importance to justify its mention in a cable dispatch.

Regarding General Garcia's defection, it was noticeable that the officials of the war department had a good deal of apprehension over the outlook. It was not doubted that he either had or would take some such action as that reported for all the information that had come to the department seemed to indicate dissatisfaction on the part of the Cuban commander at the attitude assumed by General Shafter. However, as the latter was acting strictly in accordance with the published directions of the president in maintaining the status quo of Santiago so far as it related to the municipal administration, the blame for a rupture, if one ensued, could not be placed entirely upon General Shafter's shoulders.

WOOD TO GOVERN SANTIAGO.

Play del Est. Santiago de Cuba, July 21.—Delayed in transmission.—General Wood, of the Rough Riders, was appointed military governor of Santiago de Cuba yesterday, succeeding General McKibbin, who returns to his duty and who is on the sick list.

Squads of natives were sent today to clean the streets and bury the dead, and horses whose remains have been lying in the streets for days and weeks. Other steps to improve the sanitary condition of the city are being taken.

COMMERCE REVIVES.

Santiago de Cuba, July 21.—Delayed in transmission.—The French cruiser Rigault de Genouilly arrived there this afternoon with supplies for the relief of the French citizens of Santiago.

The Danish steamer Bratton, the first vessel, outside of the government an Red Cross ships, to enter this port, with provisions, arrived here at 9 o'clock this morning, having on board A. P. Anovado, the owner of her cargo, who went to General Shafter's headquarters in order to inquire about the customs duties. He was

DUMPTIOUS AS GARCIA

Aguinaldo Allows Himself to Get the Big Head.

WON'T BE SUBORDINATE

To the United States--That is, He Thinks He Won't.

Hong Kong, July 22.—Letters received here from Cavite, dated July 19, differ from the advices received direct from Manila. The former say the insurgents have been repulsed near Malabon, and that they are now making less progress. There is also said to be much discussion among them, owing to alleged bribery upon the part of priests.

Aguinaldo, it is further said, refuses to be subordinated to the United States. He does not seem to realize his position, as evidenced by his appointment of a cabinet, his declaration of independence, and the formal hoisting of the insurgent flag.

About 1,500 Americans, it also appears from the letters from Cavite, have been landed half way between Manila and Cavite and the United States cruiser Boston has gone to support them in case of an emergency.

COAL CARGOES FOR DEWEY.

Manila, July 19, via Hong Kong, July 22.—The British steamers Cirius and Nyanza have arrived here with coal for the American fleet.

FIGHTING ABOUT MANILA

Manila, July 19, via Hong Kong, July 22.—The insurgents are gradually getting artillery into action against Pondo, Santa Mesa and Malabon. The fighting is desultory. The Spaniards have been driven from the trenches outside Malabon and the insurgents are strongly entrenched near the walls of the fort. The insurgents have begun to bombard Malabon fort and have struck the telephone company's cable house.

It is said on semi-official Spanish authority in Manila that the recent news from Cuba is "a vile English fabrication," that in reality the Spaniards have been victorious, that "Admiral Camara's squadron has sailed at Singapore" and is expected here on July 25.

New York, July 22.—A special to the Journal dated Cavite, July 19, via Hong Kong, July 22, says:

The entire regiment of First California volunteers advanced today to Janbo, only two miles from the Spanish lines surrounding Manila.

The California troops have been nethered out by General Anderson to form the advance of the attack in force. South Manila is to be captured first. The Colorado and Utah batteries are being landed at Parangue, directly from the ships; the Tenth Pennsylvania volunteers with the rest.

ANDERSON'S REPORT

Washington, July 22.—The following cablegram has just been received at the war department:

Hong Kong, July 22.—Secretary of the Navy: allowing to the secretary of war to the adjutant general: Aguinaldo declares dictatorship and martial law over all the island. The people expect independence. Recommend China policy.

ANDERSON.

Colonel Anderson was the senior army officer at the Philippines when the dispatch was sent, probably several days before its Hong Kong date. The reference to China policy means that Colonel Anderson declares that kind of cavalry animals.

WAKE ISLAND NO GOOD

Theory official communication that had reached the war department today touching the state of affairs at the Philippines was contained in a brief dispatch received from Colonel Anderson, the commander of the first military expedition. He made no mention of the reported seizure by the second detachment on its way coming over, of Wake Island, lying about half way between Honolulu and the Philippines. No particular significance, however, was attached to this seizure, even should it be reported, exactly for it was known in advance that the program was for both the naval and military expeditions to touch on their way westward from Honolulu at any of the small Spanish islands not possessed by any other nation, for the purpose of taking on coal from the coillera accompanying them, a work which could be undertaken safely only in smooth water. It was said to be very likely that this had been done at Wake Island, and that as an incident a flag might have been hoisted, though from the described character of the island, it was likely to be of little service as a mooring station without expensive harbor improvements, and no service at all as a cable station because it was a coral island and therefore destructive to cables.

The German ambassador, Dr. von Holten, had a half-hour conference with the president at the White House today. The Associated Press can state positively and authoritatively that the call had no reference to the Philippines, to peace negotiations or to any matter connected with the war.

MIDWAY CLEANED UP

Chickamauga, July 22.—The Chattanooga police have received from General Brooke descriptions of a number of soldiers who have deserted from various regiments at Camp Thomas, and they are doing all they can to assist the army officers in apprehending them. The positions "landed" at Lytle to be cleaned up and that a lot of force of hands was at work today shoveling out trash and impure wagon-loads of rubbish. This is not because of any scruples or sense of duty on the part of the occupants of the street, but because they have to clean up. General Brooke, commanding at Chickamauga, has issued an order which there is no way of evading. General Brooke ordered Lytle to be cleaned up and that at once. He gave the occupants until the night to have the rubbish removed and the ground in front and behind their premises in perfectly clean condition. If by tonight the midway were not cleaned up General Brooke threatened to place a protest guard around the entrance to the street and no soldiers would be allowed to enter. The midway for some time has been in bad condition and doubtless has caused considerable sickness.

Captain Geddie, detailed by the Norwegian government to witness the movements of United States troops during the war at Camp Thomas, has just arrived from Santiago, where he witnessed the attack on that city. He will accompany General Brooke's expedition to Porto Rico.

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